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Contribution of Human Factors to Fishing Vessel 
Accidents and Near Misses in the UK 
Iraklis Lazakis, Rafet Emek Kurt and Osman Turan 
Department of Naval Architecture, Ocean and Marine Engineering, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow G4 0LZ, UK 
 
Abstract: The research paper in hand presents a thorough exploration of the fishing vessel accidents and near misses in the UK 
fishing industry as well as the underlying human element factors and sub-factors contributing to them. In this respect, the regulatory 
regime in the fishing industry both at a national and international level is initially examined while also complemented by the 
investigation of past research efforts to address these issues. Furthermore, the analysis of the fishing vessels accidents and near 
misses as recorded in the UK MAIB (Marine Accident Investigation Branch) database for a period of 19 years is performed in order 
to derive the very causal factors leading to the fishing vessel accidents. It is initially shown that the fatalities and injuries taking place 
due to fishing vessels’ accidents have alarmingly remained unchanged over the last 15-20 years. Another key finding is that the 
number of accidents and near misses per day and night shifts is quite similar while most accidents take place in coastal waters. 
Furthermore, human factors are related to the vast majority of fishing vessels accidents with the principal ones referring to 
“non-compliance”, “equipment misuse or poorly designed”, “training” and “competence”. Finally, remedial measures are also 
suggested in order to address the main accident causes identified. 
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1. Introduction 
The fishing vessel industry is a sector in which 
accidents, injuries and fatalities still occur with 
alarming proportions as shown in many studies by 
ILO (International Labour Organization) [1], FAO 
(Food and Agriculture Organization) [2] and the UK 
MCA (Maritime Coastguard Agency) [3]. The 
international labour and maritime community has 
repeatedly tried to address this issue during the past 
decades by introducing regulations and guidelines as 
well as pursuing the training and safety regime of 
crew and workers onboard fishing vessels. However, 
accidents and near misses still occur, compromising 
the life and occupational well-being of crew and 
workers onboard these vessels. Moreover, the rate of 
vessel losses as well as that of injuries and fatalities 
occurring onboard fishing vessels has almost 
remained unchanged throughout the years. Therefore, 
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the foremost aim of the present paper is to examine 
and analyse the fishing vessels accidents as these have 
been recorded in the UK MAIB (Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch) database for a period of 19 
years in order to find the principal as well as the 
underlying factors which contribute to these accidents. 
Furthermore, the study herein attempts to drill into the 
details of the recorded accidents and near misses so as 
to identify the contributing factors specifically 
attributed to the human element, thus highlighting the 
significance of this aspect. Additionally, the present 
study is expanded in order to examine the relevance 
and influence of the aforementioned factors to the 
accidents and near misses occurring on different types 
of fishing vessels (trawlers, potters, netters, liners) as 
well as in different locations (coastal waters, high seas, 
port/harbour area, river/canal). 
In this respect, the paper in hand consists of the 
following sections. An in-depth review of the national 
and international regulations and guidelines with 
regards to commercial fishing is shown in the Section 
D 
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2, while Section 3 presents the investigation on the 
fishing vessel accidents derived from the analysis of 
the MAIB database for a period of 19 years. 
Furthermore, the results of the aforementioned study 
are discussed in Section 4 while the conclusions 
derived from the analysis performed are presented in 
Section 5. Moreover, further suggestions on how to 
tackle the issues identified from the analysis 
performed before are also suggested. 
2. Review of Fishing Vessel Incidents 
The efforts of the international community to 
address the accidents and near misses stemming from 
commercial fishing activities were initially tackled 
with the cooperation of international bodies such as 
the IMO (International Maritime Organization), ILO 
and FAO. In this respect, a good number of 
publications exist both at national and international 
level. In this respect, the requirements pertaining to 
safety, health practices, construction and equipment 
for fishing vessels over 24 m in length were 
introduced in 1968 and updated at a later stage by 
FAO/ILO/IMO [4, 5], but also for fishing vessels of 
less than 12 m long [6]. Related to the maritime 
context, IMO introduced and adopted the 
Torremolinos Protocol in 1993, addressing the safety 
of fishing vessels [7] as well as the STCW-F 
(International Convention on Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel) in 
1995, supporting the overall operation and 
watchkeeping of fishing vessels [8]. More recently, 
ILO also suggested a series of guidelines for the work 
onboard fishing vessels [9, 10]. All the above show 
the continuous support and efforts of the international 
community to assist and regulate the commercial 
fishing sector in order to reduce the fishing vessel 
incidents, injuries and fatalities occurring worldwide. 
Moreover, further research has been performed 
regarding the accidents and near misses in the fishing 
industry. In a paper by Jin et al. [11], the vessel losses 
as well as the injuries and fatalities in the US 
commercial fishing industry are examined, while 
Wiseman and Burge [12] discuss the accidents 
occurring in the fishing vessels of less than 20 m in 
the Newfoundland region of Canada. The ABS 
(American Bureau of Shipping) prepared a study 
which compares the US, UK, Canada, and Australia 
accident databases [13] in which they show that 
80%-85% of accidents are attributed to human error 
and almost 50% are directly initiated by them. On the 
other hand, Chauvin and Le Bouar [14] focus on the 
occupational hazards of fishing in the French fishing 
industry and more particularly, during the actual 
process of fishing, while Antao et al. [15] discuss the 
occupational hazardstaking place in the Portuguese 
fishing sector. Additionally, Roberts [16] investigates 
the fatality rates of crew onboard fishing vessels in the 
UK sector and compares them with similar fatality 
rates in other UK industries. He furthermore suggests 
that the use of personal safety devices, reducing lone 
fishing as well as properly maintained fishing vessels 
may reduce the number of fatalities and injuries 
occurring. 
The investigation regarding fishing vessel accidents 
is also examined by Wang et al. [17], who discuss the 
loss of vessels and the related contributing factors. 
Among other factors, they identify the vessel 
machinery damage, vessel groundings as well as 
collisions and contacts as the principal factors for the 
fishing vessels’ accidents. Machinery failure is also 
the dominant accident factor for vessels less than 12 m 
as shown in a report by MCA [18]. In this direction, 
FAO/ILO/IMO [19] has issued guidelines regarding 
the standards on design, construction and equipment 
so as to address the issue of smaller fishing vessels. 
Moreover, in a report by MAIB [20], other factors 
contributing to the fishing vessel accidents are related 
to human factors like fatigue and lack of sleep, as well 
as technical factors including pipework failures, 
malfunction of the automatic bilge alarm and deck 
openings exposed to weather and seawater. 
In addition to the above, Turan et al. [21] carry out 
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a more thorough investigation of the loss of life 
onboard fishing vessels. In their paper, they combine 
the FTA (fault tree analysis) with the FST (fuzzy set 
theory) in order to identify the most critical factors 
and events which lead to the potential loss of life on 
fishing vessels. In this respect, they present a list of 
the most important contributing factors regarding the 
design of the vessels and the actual operational issues 
involving the workers and crew onboard. Moreover, 
the specific design issues which influence the human 
related errors are also examined in a study by 
McSweeney et al. [22] in which various factors are 
mentioned such as fatigue and stress, human-machine 
interface design, workplace design as well as 
procedures onboard the vessel. 
Having observed the above research and regulatory 
efforts, it is worthwhile investigating not only the 
principal reasons of the fishing vessel accidents but 
also the major factors and sub-factors leading to them. 
In this respect, the present paper investigates the 
recorded accidents and near misses as mentioned in 
the MAIB database with particular reference to the 
human underlying factors and sub-factors of the 
registered fishing vessel accidents. In this way, the 
fishing vessel accidents and near misses are studied in 
depth bearing in mind that the fatalities and injuries in 
this industry still remain high over the last few years. 
In order to perform the above, the number of accidents 
and near misses, the fishing vessel GT (gross tonnes) 
and number of fishing vessels are initially examined. 
Moreover, the fishing vessel injuries and fatalities 
through the years are also investigated together with 
the relationship the aforementioned examination. 
Moreover, it is important to supplement the generic 
overview of fishing vessels accidents and near misses 
by specifically considering their distribution per 
vessel type (trawler, netter, potter and liner), GRT 
(gross registered tonnes) capacity (smaller or bigger 
vessels) and location (coastal waters, high seas, and 
port/harbour and river/canal areas). Besides the above, 
the fishing vessel accident distribution per crew shift 
is examined in order to observe whether the working 
schedule influences the number of accidents. 
Furthermore, the various AF (accident factors) 
category per location and vessel type is shown. 
Detailed analysis is also performed regarding the AF 
“people” and “system” per year while the ASF 
(accident sub-factors) are examined per vessel type 
and location as well. All the above are described in 
detail in the following section. 
3. Analysis of the MAIB Database 
3.1 Initial Analysis of the MAIB Database 
As mentioned before, the accidents and near misses 
presented in this study are part of the UK MAIB 
database which has been recorded for a period of 19 
years (1991 to 2009). These refer to accidents and 
incidents that have occurred onboard UK fishing 
vessels or have taken place in UK waters. 
While accidents are a commonly used term, near 
misses refer to any hazardous incident. Moreover, 
“fishing vessels” denote the “fishing catching and 
processing” vessels. Having the above definitions in 
mind, the total number of incidents per vessel type as 
they recorded in the UK MAIB database for the last 
19 years is investigated as shown in Table 1. As can 
be seen, out of a total number of 8,676 vessels which 
were involved in near misses or accidents, almost one 
third of the total number included fishing vessels 
(2,688 incidents or 30.98%). 
 
Table 1  Total number of incidents per vessel type (1991 to 
2009).  
Vessel category Count % 
Fish catching/processing 2,688 30.98 
Dry cargo 1,985 22.88 
Other commercial  1,464 16.87 
Pleasure craft (non-commercial) 876 10.10 
Passenger/passenger cargo 800 9.22 
Tanker/combination carrier 651 7.50 
Other (non-commercial) 198 2.28 
Blanks 14 0.16 
Total 8,676 100.00 
 
Contribution of Human Factors to Fishing Vessel Accidents and Near Misses in the UK 
 
248
This is a surprisingly high number, especially when 
compared to other vessel types in the database, 
denoting that almost one fishing vessel is involved in 
an accident or near miss every day over the period of 
19 years. Furthermore, fishing vessels are closely 
followed by dry cargo vessels (22.88%), other 
commercial vessels (16.87%), pleasure craft 
(non-commercial) accidents and near misses (10.10%). 
“Other commercial” vessels refer to commercial 
angling vessels as well as workboats and other small 
commercial vessels. 
Having observed Table 1, it is clearly depicted that 
fishing vessel accidents require more in-depth analysis 
in order to identify their underlying causes and 
comprehend their occurrence mechanism so as to enable 
the suggestion of measures for safer fishing vessel 
operations. In addition to the above and in 
continuation of the investigation of the key contributors 
of the fishing vessel incidents, the MAIB database is 
analysed and examined in depth. In this respect, the 
number of fishing vessels registered in the UK as well 
as their number over the years is shown in Fig. 1.  
As is shown in Fig. 1, the number of registered 
fishing vessels has declined over the past few years 
(from around 8,500 vessels in 1996 down to 6,500 in 
2009), influencing the GT number for the same fleet 
(270,000 down to around 200,000). The latter is 
expected as it is directly proportional to the number of 
UK fishing vessels. This also can be partially 
attributed to the decrease in the number of bigger 
fishing vessels employed in distant areas far away 
from shore, compared to the smaller one, which 
mainly operate in waters around the UK as is 
mentioned by Roberts [16]. Related to the above, a 
decrease in the number of vessels lost per year as well 
as the number of fishing vessel accidents is presented 
during the same time interval in Fig. 2. As is shown in 
Fig. 2, the total loss of fishing vessels has declined 
through the years apart from fluctuations shown at 
specific time points, which can be attributed to high 
accident rate at that time. 
 
Fig. 1  Number and GT of UK fishing vessels per year (UK 
MMO (Marine Management Organisation) 2011).  
 
 
Fig. 2  Number of fishing vessel loses and accidents (UK 
registered fleet, 1992-2009).  
 
This is confirmed by the reduction of the total 
number of accidents, which has also significantly 
decreased from 550 in 1995 to around 200 in 2009. 
The decreasing trend can be explained by the latest 
improvements in the training offered to fishermen and 
workers onboard fishing vessels as well as the latest 
developments regarding the awareness about safety 
culture. Other contributing factors also include the 
enhancement in the maintenance regime concerning 
the subject vessels together with improving the overall 
design in terms of stability issues [23]. Related to the 
above, another interesting feature of the UK based 
fishing vessel fleet is the number of injuries and 
fatalities occurring during the same time period, that is 
from 1992-2009 (Fig. 3). 
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Fig. 11  Distribution of fishing vessel accidents and near misses AF. 
 
“external bodies’ liaison”, “equipment” and “company 
and organization” (the definition of the various 
“system” sub-categories is given in Appendix). All 
these sub-categories constitute the second largest 
category (35.7%ü567 recordings) followed by the 
“environment” (6.5%ü104 recordings) and “working 
environment” (3.1%ü49 recordings) accordingly. At 
this point, it is important to highlight that there may be 
overlapping accident factors among recordings in the 
MAIB database as it may be the case that an 
incident/accident could be related to more than a 
single factor. However, at the time of preparing this 
paper, it was not possible to retrieve such information, 
which would render the present study even more 
beneficial. 
Following the above line of thought, the 
distribution of the mentioned AF is examined in Figs. 
12 and 13 in order to investigate the extent of the 
influence of the given main sub-categories (i.e., 
“people” and “system”) in the fishing vessel accidents 
throughout the observed time period.  
As shown in Fig. 12, the distribution of the total 
number of AF “people” attributed to the overall 
number of fishing vessels accidents per year has been 
more or less stable for a period of ten years (1991 to 
2006). Since then, it significantly increased with a 
peak recording in 2007. At this point, it would be 
beneficial to clarify that the number of “people” AF 
per year shows the total number of AF throughout the 
specific year.In this respect, it may be the case that 
more than one “people” AF has been assigned to one 
single fishing vessel accident and accordingly more 
“people” AF than actual accidents have been recorded 
in the MAIB database. Bearing in mind the advances 
in the fishing vessel equipment, machinery and hull 
reliability over the last few years, the importance of 
the human factor and human performance related to 
fishing vessel accidents is even more highlighted. 
 
 
Fig. 12  Distribution of total number of AF “people” 
attributed to the overall number of fishing vessels accidents 
per year.  
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Fig. 13  Distribution of AF “system” per year.  
 
In the case of the “system” AF (Fig. 13), there is 
also an initial declining trend for all of the 
sub-categories in the first years of consistent recording 
(1991 to 1999) which has been increased dramatically 
in 1999 and 2000. The latter is due to better incidents 
recording procedures, which has permitted 
cataloguing all the accidents occurring with more 
details than the previous years. 
Since 2000, an increasing trend is also observed, 
especially in the case of the “crew” and “company and 
organisation” underlying factors. This also portrays 
the significance and the influence of not only the crew 
but also of the vessel management. However, one 
needs to consider that in the majority of cases, the 
owner and subsequently manager of a fishing vessel is 
her captain who participates in the everyday hurdles of 
the vessel operation together with her crew as well.  
Furthermore, the distribution of the AF categories is 
also expanded in terms of their occurrence on the 
specific vessel types examined previously; that is the 
“trawlers’, “netters’ and “potters’ (Table 2). This is 
performed in order to examine whether any variations 
exist amongst the various vessel types. As can be 
observed, “people” is the predominant AF for all 
fishing vessel types (38.98% for “trawlers”, 44.40% 
for “potters” and 61.34% for “netters”, respectively). 
“System” is the next most important AF for all three 
vessel types, with “external bodies’ liaison” being the 
most significant for the “trawlers” (14.29%) and the 
“netters” (15.13%) while being the last one in the 
“potters” (0.43%). “System-crew factors” is another 
important AF for all vessel types (13.66% for 
“trawlers”, 18.97% for “potters” and 5.88% for 
“netters”, respectively). The small number for all AF 
for the “netters” can be attributed to the overall lower 
number of incidents regarding the specific category of 
vessels. Another interesting feature of Table 2 is that 
the “working environment” as well as the “design and 
construction” AF are quite low in the major accident 
factors list in terms of the actual number of incidents 
being registered and attributed to them. This may be 
attributed to the effectiveness of the rules and 
guidelines issued by different administration bodies 
during the past few years as these have been 
introduced for the enhancement of the stability issues 
[16] and overall conditions onboard the fishing vessels 
[27-29]. 
3.4 Further Investigation of the MAIB Databaseü
ASF  
So far, the main contributing fishing vessels AF 
have been examined. However, the fundamental 
question on which are the very specific reasons for the 
occurrence of the fishing vessel accidents and near 
misses still remains. This is answered by investigating 
the underlying ASF as recorded in the MAIB database. 
 
Table 2  AF per vessel type (trawler, potter, netter).  
AF % 
(Accident factors ) Trawlers Potters Netters 
People 38.98 44.40 61.34 
Systemüexternal’ bodies 
liaison 14.29 0.43 15.13 
Systemücrew factors 13.66 18.97 5.88 
Systemücompany and 
organization 11.80 2.59 1.68 
Environment 9.01 21.55 n/a 
Systemüequipment 5.90 3.88 3.36 
Working environment 2.33 1.29 4.20 
External causes 2.02 1.29 3.36 
Design and construction 1.40 4.74 3.36 
Material/mechanical defect 0.62 0.86 1.68 
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These are initially examined as per different vessel 
type and location in which these have occurred. At 
first, the ASF per vessel type are shown in Tables 3-5.  
As is shown in Table 3, the “non-compliance” ASF 
is the main causal factor for the “trawler” (almost 
14%). This factor appears to be the most      
common underlying accident sub-factor in fishing       
vessel incidents and is considered mostly human factor  
 
Table 3  UASF (Underlying Accident Sub-Factors) per 
vessel type (trawler).  
ASF % Count 
Non-compliance 13.97 88 
Inadequate resources 9.05 57 
Heavy weather 8.41 52 
Procedures 8.10 50 
Fatigue 6.51 40 
Perception of risk 5.24 32 
Competence 4.29 27 
Poor decision making/information use 4.29 27 
Management  3.65 20 
Complacency 3.02 19 
 
Table 4  UASF per vessel type (netter).  
UASF % Count 
Non compliance 14.71 17 
Violation of procedures 14.71 17 
Perception of risk 13.73 16 
Complacency 7.84 9 
Visual environment 4.90 6 
Competence 3.42 4 
Equipment not available 3.42 4 
Inattention 3.42 4 
Other vessel 3.42 4 
Outside operational design limits 3.42 4 
 
Table 5 UASF per vessel type (potter).  
UASF % Count 
Equipment (misuse, poorly designed) 19.91 45 
Training 13.27 30 
Competence 8.41 19 
Culture 7.52 17 
Complacency 5.31 12 
Inattention 5.31 12 
Procedures inadequate 4.42 10 
Design inadequate 3.98 9 
Fatigue 2.65 6 
Perception of risk 2.65 6 
related. Unfortunately, not following or fulfilling the 
applicable regulations is common in the fishing 
vessels and is attributed to the very specific nature of 
fishing as discussed by Bosma and Turan [30]. For 
example, it is reported that for 55 accidents for every 
1,000 fishing vessels, safety standards onboard the 
vessels are still below the level where they are 
supposed to be according to national and international 
regulations. A good example is given in the same 
study [30] where a 36 meter UK registered fishing 
vessel flooded and sunk during fishing operations 
after water penetrated into accommodation areas 
through a water tight door which was supposed to be 
kept shut. According to the results of the survey 
conducted, shockingly 90% of participants mentioned 
that they went to sea under influence of alcohol; 
similarly 53% admitted consuming alcohol during 
fishing. Moreover, 50% of participants admitted use 
of other substances at sea which clearly violates the 
Section 78 of Railways and Transport Safety 
Act-Navigating the vessel under influence of alcohol. 
These can be overcome by being more stringent on the 
relevant regulations as well as conducting awareness 
training so as to introduce a proactive approach 
towards this causal factor.  
Moreover, “inadequate resources” (9.05%) is the 
second largest contributing sub-factor for trawlers and 
can be defined as the resources needed to complete a 
job effectively and safely (such as time, finance and 
personnel). The latter is related to manning procedures 
onboard the fishing vessels, while the insufficient time 
refers to the inadequate time allowed for crew 
hand-over procedures, which in turn may result in the 
crew not allocating enough time for task requirement 
updates. In addition to the above, “heavy weather” is 
still a main factor for trawler accidents (8.41%). This 
can be justified by the very nature of the type of work 
that trawlers undertake, while sailing and working in 
the open seas with harsher weather conditions. In 
addition to the above, the next most important factor 
is the “procedures” (8.10%) and “fatigue” (6.51%). 
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The “perception of risk” (5.24%) is still high in the list 
referring to the subjective judgment that people make 
about the severity of a risk and can be improved by 
introducing further training in the fishing sector [21]. 
In the case of the “netters”, they present similar 
ASF to the “trawlers”. These refer to “non-compliance” 
(14.71%), “violation of procedures” (14.71%) and 
“perception of risk” (13.73%). Especially regarding 
the “violation of procedures” sub-factor, it is directly 
related to the crew not following the right procedures 
(“cutting corners”) and endangering the operation of 
the vessel as well as of the crew working onboard. 
Furthermore, “complacency” (7.84%) is the next most 
important sub-factor for this type of vessel including 
the incidents related to individuals which are not 
satisfied with a standard of performance. 
Moreover, Table 5 shows the ASF for the “potter” 
fishing vessels. In this case, “equipment” (19.91%) is 
the main underlying sub-factor followed by “training” 
(13.27%) and “competence” (8.41%). The “equipment” 
ASF is a combination of several categories including 
equipment not available, badly maintained or misused. 
It is clear from the above the direct link of the human 
element in this sub-factor (badly maintained or 
misused equipment by crew onboard the vessel). 
However, the lack of training can be addressed 
through the implementation of training programmes 
regarding the day-to-day vessel operations so as to 
improve the overall education and performance of the 
crew and make them familiar with the technological 
innovations present in their everyday life [31]. In the 
case of crew “competence”, it is an expected result for 
this vessel type as these vessels are smaller in size and 
are not covered by the same regulations and guidelines 
regarding the competency certificates as for the bigger 
vessels (longer than 24 m in length). With regards to 
the above, it would be helpful if the crewmembers’ 
competence level is assessed, recorded and updated by 
the local authorities (e.g., MCA) at regular intervals 
bearing in mind the specific particularities of the 
fishing industry. Additionally, in order to examine 
whether the above mentioned underlying sub-factors 
are influenced by the location in which the accidents 
has occurred (that is near-shore or in offshore waters), 
the analysis of the ASF according to the specific 
locations is shown in Tables 6-8. 
In this case, it can be observed that the results 
regarding the ASF per location differentiate 
significantly. While “non-compliance” is the main 
sub-factor for the coastal waters and high seas (7.18% 
 
Table 6  Top 10 of the UASF per location (coastal waters).  
UASF % Count 
Non-compliance 7.18 95 
Heavy weather 6.65 88 
Equipment 6.35 84 
Fatigue and vigilance 5.22 69 
Inadequate resources 4.69 62 
Perception of risk 4.54 60 
Competence 4.38 58 
Inattention 3.70 49 
Poor decision making/information use 3.33 44 
Procedures inadequate 3.33 44 
 
Table 7  Top 10 of the UASF per location (high seas).  
UASF % Count 
Non-compliance 17.45 41 
Perception of risk 13.19 31 
Violation of procedures 12.34 29 
Visual environment 5.11 12 
Procedures inadequate 4.26 10 
Fatigue and vigilance 3.40 8 
Manning (rotation /watches) 2.98 7 
Perception abilities 2.55 6 
Unsafe working practices 2.55 6 
Poor decision making/information use 2.55 6 
 
Table 3  Top ten of the UASF per location (port/harbor 
area).  
UASF % Count 
Culture 8.75 14 
Poor decision making/information use 8.75 14 
Complacency 8.13 13 
Fatigue and vigilance 8.13 13 
Inattention 6.25 10 
Competence 5.00 8 
Visual environment 4.38 7 
Perception of risk 3.75 6 
Procedures inadequate 3.13 5 
Heavy weather 2.50 4 
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and 17.45%, respectively), it is not included at all in 
the list of the highest ranked ASF for the port/harbour 
areas. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
port/harbour areas are more difficult areas to navigate 
and furthermore more closely invigilated compared to 
the other two locations and thus crew awareness is 
greater. In terms of the other ASF, “heavy weather” is 
the second most important factor for the coastal waters 
(6.65%) followed by “equipment” (6.35%) as well as 
‘fatigue and vigilance” (5.22%).  
For the “heavy weather” sub-factor, the safety 
procedures in place as well as the mandatory personal 
safety equipment may assist in reducing the incidents 
pertinent to this factor especially when referring to the 
exposed sea environment in the coastal areas. 
Regarding the “equipment” ASF, it refers to badly 
maintained, misused or poorly designed equipment 
onboard the vessels. The first can be rectified with 
appropriate maintenance procedures in place and close 
adherence to the planned maintenance system      
of the vessel although such a procedure is not 
formalised to the extent it is implemented in the case 
of bigger merchant vessels (e.g., tankers, container 
ships, cruise vessels). On the other hand, regular 
checks of the machinery and fishing-working 
equipment should be part of the best-practice guide for 
such vessels. In addition to the above, the ASF of 
misused and poorly designed equipment can be 
addressed with careful usage and planning of the 
equipment onboard, including potential use of 
software equipment. 
Moreover, “fatigue and vigilance” refers to the 
crew’s incapacity to maintain a sufficient level of 
attention so as to monitor the progress and control of 
the vessel adequately. This can be due to a number of 
reasons such as not enough rest-hours [32] as well as 
the generation of noise which affects the vigilant 
performance of the crew [33]. For the high sea areas, 
apart from the “non-compliance” factor, the 
“perception of risk” is also high in the relevant list 
(13.19%) followed by “violation of procedures” 
(12.34%) and “visual environment” (5.11%). As 
mentioned before, these accident sub-factors are 
relevant to the specific nature of the fishing industry, 
which is still highly dominated by the personal 
working and management conditions onboard the 
fishing vessels. 
On the other hand, in the case of port/harbour areas, 
the ASF are mostly related to the specific conditions 
prevailing in such areas. That is, more personally 
attributed factors such as the “culture” (8.75%), “poor 
decision making/information use” (8.75%), 
“complacency” (8.13%), “fatigue and vigilance” 
(8.13%) and “inattention” (6.25%). “Culture” refers to 
the “characteristics derived from nationally ethnic 
backgrounds that influence interactions with other 
crew members or attitudes to safety” [34].  
Additionally, “poor decision making/information 
use” accounts for the identification and choice among 
different options by the decision-maker, in which case, 
the captain of the vessel, who faces more difficult 
situations when the vessel sails in the demanding 
(from a navigational point of view) operational 
environment of the port/harbour area. In this case, 
adequate procedures and sufficient training so as to 
familiarise the captain of the vessel are needed. 
“Complacency” on the other hand denotes the 
“organisation/individual is inappropriately satisfied 
with a standard of performance” [34] while “fatigue 
and vigilance” addresses the inability of the crew 
control on the operations of the vessel.  
Regarding the “inattention” sub-factor, it considers 
among others the improper lookout and especially 
non-monitoring of the navigational displays in the 
constrained for navigation port/harbour areas. In this 
case, maintaining the resting periods between the 
working shifts is paramount as well as avoiding 
fatigue and inattention contribution factors. As can be 
observed, the ASF for the port/harbour area are all 
directly related to the human factors side of accidents, 
highlighting the importance of addressing these 
factors compared to other incident locations. 
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4. Discussion 
The research study in hand has examined the 
specific characteristics of the fishing vessel industry 
including legislative and administrative rules and 
regulations in UK and internationally. In addition to 
the above, the analysis of the UK MAIB database has 
taken place for a period of 19 years. At first, it is 
shown that fishing vessel incidents form a big part of 
the database recordings (30.98%) which signifies the 
initial need for further investigation on the subject 
accidents and near misses. When observing the total 
number of the UK registered fishing vessel fleet as 
well as the corresponding GT, it can be seen that both 
these figures are in a declining trend over the years, 
showing the decrease in the number of bigger fishing 
vessels employed in the fishing industry. The number 
of vessel losses and total accidents has been 
decreasing throughout the years as well as the total 
number of fatalities and injuries. The latter may be 
attributed to the improvements on the training of 
professional fishermen, the safety culture being 
developed over the years, the improvement in the 
overall maintenance planning as well as the improved 
stability design of the fishing vessels. 
However, further examination on the vessel losses, 
injuries and fatalities over the total fishing vessel 
number shows that they have remained alarmingly 
unchanged for the same time frame despite the 
national and international efforts. In this respect, 
further analysis on the MAIB database is performed in 
a number of different areas, including the distribution 
of accident and near misses per fishing vessel category. 
With regards to the above, trawlers are the ones 
involved most (27.8%) followed by potters (8.3%) and 
netters (4.2%).  
Moreover, when examining the accidents and near 
misses per location and year, the majority has 
occurred in coastal waters followed by high seas; this 
is explained due to the exposed nature of these areas 
compared to the more sheltered waters of port/harbour 
and river/canals areas. On top of the above, most of 
the accidents and near misses in all vessel categories 
have occurred in coastal waters while only a few of 
them have taken place in port/harbour and river/canal 
areas. Furthermore, when examining the time of their 
occurrence (based on the 4-hour day and night shifts), 
it is hard to conclude on the existence of a significant 
relationship between the number of accidents and time 
of the day; thus, it is shown that they are not 
influenced by the crew working schedule. 
When examining the underlying factors for the 
fishing vessel accidents, the “human factor” is 
attributed to the majority of accidents (89%) 
compared to just 11% for the “technical factor”. 
Furthermore, the “human factor” is the predominant 
one when examining the incidents per location as well 
as vessel type. This trend also highlights the need for 
further investigation into the fishing vessel accident 
and near misses. This is performed by an in-depth 
examination of the underlying AF for the “human 
factor” category. In this case, “people” is the major 
underlying AF (48.8%). Having a look at the overall 
distribution over the years, it is observed that after a 
constant rate till 2001, it has increased significantly 
till 2007 and started declining since then. Regarding 
the “system’ factor (35.7%), it includes the “crew 
factors”, “external bodies’ liaison”, “equipment” and 
“company and organization” and presents a similar 
trend through the years, especially regarding the crew 
and the vessel management. 
The results regarding the AF for the various vessel 
types are also similar to the above (i.e., trawlers, etc.). 
In this respect, “people” is the predominant AF for all 
the fishing vessel types (38.98% for “trawlers”, 44.40% 
for “potters” and 61.34% for “netters’, respectively), 
followed by the “system” AF. In this case, the low 
results for the “working environment” and the “design 
and construction” may be explained due to the 
introduction of various guidelines especially in the last 
10-15 years [27-29].  
In addition to the above, more details regarding the 
very specific contributing accident factors are given 
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when examining the underlying ASF. In this respect, 
the ASF per vessel type display that “non-compliance” 
is the main causal factor for the “trawler” and “netter” 
followed by “inadequate resources”, “heavy weather” 
and “perception of risk”. For the “potter” vessel type 
“equipment”, “training” and “competence” are the 
main ASF and can be dealt with the implementation of 
training programmes regarding the day-to-day vessel 
operations as well as if the crewmembers’ competence 
level is assessed, recorded and updated at regular 
intervals [35]. 
As for the ASF with regards to the accidents 
location, variations are observed between the coastal 
and high seas areas and the port/harbour areas. This is 
due to the fact that the port/harbour areas are more 
difficult areas to navigate in and accordingly crew 
awareness and vigilance is greater. However, the 
particular ASF can be improved by a number of 
measures in place. These include safety procedures 
and mandatory personal safety equipment (“weather”), 
regular checks and following the planned maintenance 
procedures of the vessel (“equipment”), adequate 
procedures and sufficient training for the captain of 
the vessel (“poor decision making/information use”), 
keeping the resting periods between the working shifts 
(“fatigue and vigilance”) [36], adhering and making 
sure that the introduced rules and regulations are 
followed (“non-compliance”) and integrating the 
various nationality issues in everyday life onboard the 
fishing vessels (“culture”) as also suggested by 
Branagan and Turan [31]. 
5. Conclusions 
The present paper clearly shows that although there 
have been significant efforts for the prevention of 
fishing vessel losses, injuries and fatalities in the UK 
sector, there is still some way to go in order to make 
this industrial sector a safe and secure place to work. 
In this respect, the research study herein highlights the 
human factors side of the accidents and near misses 
that fishing vessels are involved in. The latter takes 
place through the examination of the MAIB database 
for a period of 19 years. The present study reveals that 
although the actual number of vessel losses and 
accidents has been decreasing throughout the years, 
the rate of injuries and fatalities per vessel has 
remained alarmingly stable over the timeframe 
examined in the MAIB database despite the efforts of 
all national and international regulatory authorities. 
The study herein also demonstrates that trawlers are 
the ones involved most (27.8%) in incidents/accidents 
followed by potters (8.3%) and netters (4.2%). 
Moreover, the majority of incidents/accidents has 
occurred in coastal waters and high seas due to the 
exposure of fishing vessels to more adverse weather 
conditions than the protected areas near ports and 
river/canals. The crew working pattern does not seem 
to influence the rate of incidents/accidents onboard 
fishing vessels as it was shown that over the regular 
4-hour crew shifts there is not much differentiation.  
Human factors dominate the results showing the 
influence to fishing vessels incidents/accidents by 89% 
compared to 11% attributed to technical factors. In 
this respect, it was shown that “people” as well as 
“system” factors are related to the majority of 
incidents/accidents per different type of fishing 
vessels such as trawlers, potters and netters. The study 
of the MAIB database also revealed that the 
introduction and application of UK and international 
legislation has reduced the incidents/accidents due to 
“working environment” and vessel “design and 
construction”. However, when examining the accident 
sub-factors, the “non-compliance”, “inadequate 
resources”, “heavy weather” and “perception of risk” 
are the main causal factors for the majority of fishing 
vessels. 
With particular relevance to the AF and ASF, 
improvements were also suggested in terms of safety 
procedures and mandatory personal safety equipment 
implemented, regular checks and follow-up of the 
planned maintenance schedule on board, adequate 
procedures and sufficient training for the captain and 
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vessel crew, maintaining the resting periods between 
the working shifts, adhering to the national and 
international rules and regulations while also taking 
into account the cultural issues that may occur through 
everyday life onboard. 
A further suggestion is related to the update of the 
MAIB database in order to provide consistency of the 
incident recordings and avoid data duplications. 
Furthermore, the assessment of fishing vessel 
incidents/accidents can be performed by employing a 
structured and rigorous approach such as the FSA 
(Formal Safety Assessment) concept already, which is 
applied in the merchant marine sector [17]. FSA is “a 
rational and systematic process for assessing the risks 
associated with shipping activity and for evaluating 
the costs and benefits of IMO’s options for reducing 
these risks” [37] and has been already applied in the 
case of merchant shipping including tankers, container 
and passenger ships among others. With it, a 
systematic methodology for dealing with fishing 
vessel accidents may take place considering various 
steps such as the identification and assessment of 
potential hazards related to fishing vessels as well as 
the consideration of risk control options. Moreover, 
the assessment of the cost-benefit ration of the 
suggested risk control measures can be performed 
leading to recommendations for the decision-makers 
to suggest and apply. Furthermore, it is also important 
to mention that the identified underlying human 
factors can be addressed with training programmes 
which effectively pursue the safety culture 
environment as in other sectors of the maritime 
industry. 
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Appendix 
System—crew factors: the interaction of the crew, the internal organization and the way in which individuals work together as a 
team, all impact on the likelihood of a human error on board ship; 
System—external bodies’ liaison: factors related to certificate fraud, non-compliance with regulations, policies or practices from 
any marine administration, manufacturers’ equipment design; 
System—equipment: related to the equipment of the vessel; 
System—company and organization: management failures contributing to the occurrence of the incident event. 
 
 
